It has been touted as the biggest story in
Indeed, Africa has shown great expectation to the thought of the newest state – the 53rd African state- and what it represents. Kenya has specifically shown great interest in the referendum not just because it has been host to thousands of Sudanese refugees but mainly because of the economic interests, possibilities and heavy investment from which Kenya is benefiting and stands to benefit from it the people of Southern Sudan vote to secede.
So important is the referendum to Kenya that the Acting Foreign Affairs Minister has pledged Kshs. 200 Million as post referendum assistance. This is not in vain but because Kenya has interests in Southern Sudan . Kenyan investors in Southern Sudan control the hospitality, banking, aviation, and construction sectors and close to 70,000 Kenyans live and work there. Peace is in Sudan is therefore paramount for the Kenyan government and investors. If a war broke out as a result of the vote, Kenya stands to loose up to Kshs. 926 Billion in 10 years.
As Africa and the world at large holds its breath ahead of the referendum, and there being all indications of a ‘yes’ vote ,signified by an open palm, it would be very important to examine what the future holds for the soon to be young state. What does it mean to secede? Would unity – as depicted on the ballot papers by clasped hands or hands held together in the form of a greeting – have been a better option? Are there any lessons that can be learnt from previous secessions or ongoing struggles for secession? What are the challenges likely to be faced as result of the secession? How does a yes vote stand to affect its neighbors and especially the East African region?
According to the Merriam Webster online dictionary, to secede is defined as a withdrawal from an organization. To put it in context, secession would mean to withdraw from being part of a larger state for reasons ranging from marginalization and neglect to outright prejudice and persecution either for economic reasons or negative ethnicity. Such a withdrawal may be a forced one as a result of liberation, or secession struggle or it may be based on an agreement or both, as is the case with Sudan .
Critics of secession or partition argue that the advocates for secession never produce enough proof or solid arguments that secession is the most viable and credible solution. President of Sudan , Omar Hassan Al – Bashir, has out rightly predicted a total breakdown of law and order and the incapacity of the post-secession states to rule themselves. The critics do not in any way, view secession as a means to permanent conflict resolution.
They argue that agitation for secession to ensure self rule is on the whole motivated by self interests as opposed to the solving of long term problems. The leaders of such agitation prefer endless attempts at conflict resolution in fancy hotels and conference centers abroad as opposed to governing in the home country. They further argue that the reasons for agitation are almost entirely based on massaging egos of tribal chiefs by awarding them seats in government and hence bloated cabinets and governments that all but drain the country and stall development.
However, as much as these critics may want to convince us a tad, a closer look at Sudan would serve to answer critics – at least in this situation.
The Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) signed between the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLA/M) and the ruling National Congress Party in 2005 was meant to end years of fighting that had led to the deaths of almost 2 Million Sudanese among them John Garang de Mabior – the first president of Southern Sudan.
This agreement was meant to usher in a time of peace, reconciliation and a time to address the causes of conflict which were mainly the neglect and marginalization of the south despite the fact that the country relies heavily on the resource rich south. The agreement provided for a referendum for secession after six years if the southerners were of the opinion that the peace agreement had not been adhered to. However, six years down the line, the south still complains of marginalization, neglect and many unfulfilled promises. So bad has it been that the International Criminal Court issues arrest warrants against the president of Sudan for alleged war crimes and genocide in the Darfur region – indeed, a clear indication that the signing of the agreement was a mere formality with no real intent to fulfill it.
In addition to this, and in the run up to the referendum, the North has steered clear of discussions of post-referendum arrangements namely: citizenship rights, border controls, sharing of assets and liabilities, dividing of oil and Nile River resources, status of the Abyei region etc. This has suggested that the north may not be willing and will not accept the results in event of a ‘yes’ vote.
The Leaders of the south have slaved to ensure that peace is maintained and that preparations for the referendum proceed according to schedule and as smoothly and meticulously as possible. They have covered the breadth of South Sudan even reaching out to those in Diaspora, preaching the importance of a united and autonomous southern Sudan . Indeed this they have done without spending time in fancy hotels and delaying the inevitable as critics may want to make believe.
Based on the conduct of the north therefore, secession is inevitable.
There have been many instances of secessions, attempts to secede and ongoing attempts at secessions - the world is literally strewn with such examples-. It is imperative that the people of Sudan keenly examine these comparatives and the lessons they can draw from these examples.
In Indonesia , the case of Aceh and Papua come to mind. As a response to mounting violence in these regions, the government, which was then very weak following the collapse of Authoritarian regime of President Suharto in 1998, conceded to secessionist demands through special concessions granting special autonomy through special autonomy laws. However, as the Central government grew in strength, it closed down the political space for independence leaders and faltered in its commitment to the special autonomy going as far as imposing martial law in Aceh and dividing Papua hence resorting to coercive rule. This has led to more injustices and alienation of local populations. Clearly, quick fix solutions are never effective especially when dealing with a party that is hell bent on continuing with marginalization and neglect of affected regions.
There may be no question about the legality of the referendum for secession in Sudan . However, and examination of the “illegal” secession of Eritrea could provide valuable lessons for South Sudan . Though Eritrea had been running as a somewhat independent state, it was not until May 1993 when through a 27th April, 1993 referendum, Eritrea ‘formally’ declared independence from Ethiopia . Many years down the line, not only is the legitimacy of the vote still in question, but the state of affairs in Eritrea leaves lingering doubts about the true motive for the secession. Not only has the government failed to implement a democratic system of government, economic and social policies, but the country is currently in the worst economic and political quagmire and is in a confused and disoriented social state. Many are fleeing the country in desperation and utter disgust of the direction the country is taking. Religious and political persecution is on the increase leaving Eritreans with no choice but to run away and silently wish for former-better days when it was part of Ethiopia . This example clearly points to the need for the leadership to keep in mind the reasons or motivation for the clamor for secession and autonomy.
Other struggles or attempts at secession are ongoing notably; Taiwan from China , Kashmir from India , Quebec from Canada , Kosovo. Each face their unique challenges but can serve as valuable lessons for Southern Sudan .
Looking ahead of a potential yes vote for secession, it would be important for every South Sudanese voter who queued to cast his or her vote on 9th January, 2011 to look at the challenges that are likely to be faced by the new state.
The first and most immediate challenge would be that of a humanitarian kind, which is already being seen, but which may not be as such a new challenge for President Salva Kiir Mayardit’s government. The influx of returnees is already a nightmare for the government and aid workers alike. Each day bus loads and truck loads of returnees arrive at border points in Southern Sudan ahead of the crucial vote. These people will have to be given temporary shelter as the government plans for their long term resettlement and reintegration. There may be resultant disputes for land and water resources and this will have to be settled immediately to enable the government carry on with its development agenda.
Second, would be the post referendum arrangements with the north. Indications are that the north will not let go of some of the resource rich regions in the south without a fight. Concessions will have to be made and agreements put in place to ensure there is no immediate economic shock. The issues of border control, movement between the north and the south, citizenship and other details will have to be ironed out.
Third would be the maintenance of good and working relations with the north that will be regulated by international law, world politics and regional cooperation.
Fourth will be the internal issues of the constitution, good governance, protection of the environment, combating corruption, implementing democratic ideals, transformation of a previously guerilla movement to a professional state military organ, avoiding negative ethnicity or tribal domination in government, sourcing for funds for infrastructure development and provision of employment opportunities for returnees.
Fifth will be states preying on and hovering around with the prospects of colonizing the new state, whether international or regional, carrying with them all manner of suggestions about how the people of Southern Sudan should run the new country and young economy.
Sixth will be the pressure to join a regional block that will provide useful support and selflessly assist in its development.
The Government and the people of Southern Sudan have already shared their desire to be part of the East African Community. This move towards regional integration will be very beneficial for the new state as well as the rest of the countries that form the EAC. An opening of the border will enable importation of much needed technical advice for the new state. It will open up a new market for its resources and a port at Mombasa and Lamu that will be used for export. Indeed a significant change will be the reduction in export costs for petroleum products which usually travel almost 3000 Kilometers to Port Sudan for export. The distance will be reduced by more than half if the same would be exported through the Lamu port.
The East African region also stands to benefit from an increase in market for their products, improved infrastructure i.e. road, rail, air, electricity and even pipeline. This will undoubtedly make it one of Africa ’s powerful and influential regional blocks.
Call it Southern Sudan, call it New Sudan, call it Equatoria, call it Juwama or the Nile Republic , whatever name they will eventually decide on, the idea of a new country, a new member of the EAC, new market, a new neighbor and the excitement, the exhilaration, the enthusiasm, the exuberance the thrill and gusto is certainly justified.
"Sixth will be the pressure to join a regional block that will provide useful support and selflessly assist in its development." Do you really think so, considering what the AU did with regard to Kenya's ICC? Sometimes i think that independence was wasted on Africa. The difference is the same
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